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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43258 
      ) 
v.      ) CANYON COUNTY  
) NO. CR 2014-27455 
      ) 
JEREMY COOK,    ) APPELLANT’S    
      )  REPLY BRIEF   
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 In his opening brief, Mr. Cook argued that the district court abused its discretion 
by sentencing him to a unified term of ten years, with four years fixed, in light of the 
mitigating factors that exist and by denying his motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 (“Rule 35”) for reduction of sentence.  In response, the State argues that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Mr. Cook.  The State also argues that 
this Court should affirm the denial of Mr. Cook’s Rule 35 motion because Mr. Cook did 
not present any new or additional information in support of his motion and, even if he 
did present such information, Mr. Cook “has still failed to establish an abuse of 
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discretion.”  (Resp. Br., p.4.)  The State is incorrect.  The district court abused its 
discretion by imposing upon Mr. Cook an excessive sentence and by denying his Rule 
35 motion, which was supported by additional information.  This Court should vacate 
Mr. Cook’s sentence and remand for resentencing.    
 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Cook, a 
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, in light of the mitigating 
factors that exist in this case? 
 
2. Did Mr. Cook present additional information to the district court in support of his 
Rule 35 motion and, if so, did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied 
that motion? 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
 The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Cook, A 
Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With Four Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating 
Factors That Exist In This Case 
 
The State’s response concerning this issue is not remarkable and, as such, no 
reply is necessary.  Accordingly, Mr. Cook refers the Court back to his opening brief for 
his argument on this issue.  (See App. Br., pp.3-5.) 
 
II. 
 
Mr. Cook Presented Additional Information To The District Court In Support Of His Rule 
35 Motion And The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied That Motion 
 
In his opening brief, Mr. Cook argued that the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his Rule 35 motion in light of the additional information he submitted to 
the court.  (App. Br., p.5.)  Mr. Cook acknowledged the district court’s statement that he 
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did not file any additional information in support of his motion, and argued that 
statement was incorrect.  (App. Br. at 5.)  In its brief, the State contends that Mr. Cook 
provided “no ‘new’ information in support of his Rule 35 motion.”  (Resp. Br., p.3.)  The 
State argues Mr. Cook’s denial that he was the person eluding police was before the 
district court at sentencing and thus was not new or additional information.  (Resp. 
Br., p.3.)  The State is incorrect—this information was not before the district court at 
sentencing and thus, it was additional information.  The district court should have 
considered this additional information and reduced Mr. Cook’s sentence.   
At sentencing, counsel for Mr. Cook argued that Mr. Cook “has two problems”—
specifically, “some degree of cognitive dysfunction” and “substance abuse.”  (Tr., p.10, 
Ls.9-14.)  Mr. Cook’s counsel talked in detail about the circumstances surrounding 
Mr. Cook’s prior conviction in California.  (Tr., p.10, L.17 – p.13, L.23.)  He also argued 
that Mr. Cook had never had substance abuse treatment and requested that the district 
court retain jurisdiction and allow Mr. Cook to participate in a rider.  (Tr., p.14, L.15 – 
p.17, L.8.)  Mr. Cook apologized for his “stupid, stupid decision” and stated he “would 
really appreciate . . . a chance at a program.”  (Tr., p.17, L.14 – p.18, L.3.)  Neither 
Mr. Cook nor his attorney addressed the charge of eluding police and neither raised any 
challenge to the information contained in the police reports or the potentially false 
identification of Mr. Cook as the person who was eluding police.   
After the district court heard from Mr. Cook and his counsel at sentencing, the 
court discussed the eluding conduct in great detail and described Mr. Cook as “a danger 
to the community” and his conduct as “particularly egregious.”  (Tr., p.19, L.15 – p.20, 
L.2; p.22, L.12 – p.23, L.1.)  The district court did not exercise any caution, let alone 
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“due caution,” in relying on the dismissed charge, and did not give Mr. Cook or his 
counsel a chance to respond.  This was an abuse of discretion.  See State v. Barnes, 
121 Idaho 409, 411 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating a sentencing court must exercise “due 
caution” in considering mere allegations of criminal conduct at sentencing).   
Mr. Cook made seven arguments in support of his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.62-
64.)  First, he argued that the police officer described the person eluding police as 
wearing a dark-colored sweatshirt, while he was wearing a very distinctive black 
sweatshirt with a yellow hood and yellow lettering.  (R., p.62.)  Second, he argued that 
the police officer described the person eluding police as leaving the Rodeo Bar, but he 
was at the Sportsman Bar.  (R., p.62.)  Third, he argued that the police officer described 
the person eluding police as having a motorcycle without a license plate, but his 
motorcycle has a license plate.  (R., p.62.)  Fourth, Mr. Cook argued that he was 
intoxicated and could not have been driving a motorcycle as described by the officer 
who saw a motorcyclist eluding police.  (R., p.62.)  Mr. Cook also pointed out that he did 
not have gloves and sunglasses, which the person eluding police had, and there were 
twenty or so people riding bikes in the same general area earlier in the day.  (R., pp.62-
63.)  Fifth, Mr. Cook stated he understood his plea bargain to be for a unified sentence 
of five years, with two years fixed.  (R., p.63.)  Sixth, Mr. Cook stated that the police 
reports are full of errors which call into question their veracity.  (R., pp.63-64.)  Mr. Cook 
also stated he was at the garage/shop, not eluding police, and explained why he fled 
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when confronted by the police.  (R., p.64.)  Finally, Mr. Cook argued he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.1  (R., p.64.)        
The information set forth above is not contained in the PSI or the police reports 
attached to the PSI.  The PSI does not state that Mr. Cook denied being the person 
eluding police and does not identify any potential issues with the police reports.  (PSI, 
pp.1-28.)  The police reports generally reflect that Mr. Cook denied being the person 
eluding police, and indicate that there was another potential suspect, but the information 
is not nearly as detailed as that set forth by Mr. Cook in support of his Rule 35 motion. 
(PSI, pp.34, 37-38, 39-40, 41-42.)  Moreover, the district court did not inquire into the 
eluding conduct at sentencing and thus had no way of knowing whether Mr. Cook still 
denied the eluding conduct.   
Mr. Cook presented additional information to the Court in support of his Rule 35 
motion.  The district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Cook’s motion where it is 
clear that it sentenced Mr. Cook for an offense that was not before the court and 
considered the existence of alleged criminal activity without due caution.  See, e.g., 
State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding the district court abused 
its discretion where it “went beyond [its] authority and essentially imposed sentence for 
offenses other than the one that was before the court”).  The proper remedy is for this 
Court to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.  See id. 
 
 
 
                                            
1 Mr. Cook recognizes that his fifth and seventh arguments do not provide a basis for a 
reduction of sentence under Rule 35. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above as well as those set forth in Mr. Cook’s opening 
brief, this Court should reduce Mr. Cook’s sentence as it deems appropriate or vacate 
that sentence and remand for resentencing.    
 DATED this 20th day of January, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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